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Abstract
This paper presents the logic QRC1, which is a strictly positive fragment of
quantified modal logic. The intended reading of the diamond modality is that of
consistency of a formal theory. Predicate symbols are interpreted as parametrized
axiomatizations. We prove arithmetical soundness of the logic QRC1 with respect
to this arithmetical interpretation.
Quantified provability logic is known to be undecidable. However, the unde-
cidability proof cannot be performed in our signature and arithmetical reading.
We conjecture the logic QRC1 to be arithmetically complete. This paper takes
the first steps towards arithmetical completeness by providing relational seman-
tics for QRC1 with a corresponding completeness proof. We also show the finite
model property, which implies decidability.
Keywords: Provability logic, strictly positive logics, quantified modal logic, arith-
metic interpretations, feasible fragments.
1 Introduction
We present a new provability logic QRC1, standing for Quantified Reflection Calculus
with one modality. The best known provability logic is perhaps GL [7]. Recall that
GL is a PSPACE decidable propositional modal logic where the modality  is used to
model formal provability in some base theory such as Peano Arithmetic (PA). Likewise,
the dual modality ♦ is used to model consistency over the base theory. By Solovay’s
celebrated completeness result [19] we know that, in a sense, the logic GL generates
exactly the provably-in-PA structural behavior of formal provability.
∗anadealmeidagabriel@ub.edu
†jjoosten@ub.edu
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Let us make this slightly more precise. By a realization ⋆ we mean a map from
propositional variables to sentences in the language of Peano Arithmetic. The realiza-
tion is extended to all propositional modal formulas by defining (ϕ ∧ ψ)⋆ := ϕ⋆ ∧ ψ⋆
and likewise for other Boolean connectives. Finally, we define (ϕ)⋆ := PAϕ
⋆, where
PA is a formula in the language of PA that arithmetizes formal provability in PA in the
sense1 that PA ⊢ χ if and only if N |= PAχ. We can now paraphrase Solovay’s result
as GL = {ϕ | ∀ ⋆ PA ⊢ ϕ⋆}.
After Solovay’s completeness theorem, it was natural to ask whether one could
find a logic that generates exactly the provably-in-PA structural behavior of formal
provability for (relational) quantified modal logic. The main difference with GL is that
we now understand a realization ∗ as a map from relation symbols to sentences in the
language of Peano Arithmetic such that the free variables match the arity of the relation
symbol. Vardanyan showed in [20] that the situation is now completely different; now
{ϕ | ∀ ∗ PA ⊢ ϕ∗} is Π02-complete, a big jump from the PSPACE decidability of GL.
Visser and de Jonge showed that Vardanyan’s result can be extended to a wide range
of arithmetical theories and called their paper No escape from Vardanyan’s theorem [21].
Here we shall take some first steps to indeed find an escape to Vardanyan’s theorem.
We do so by making two adaptations to the standard setting. First, we resort to a very
small fragment of Relational Predicate Modal logic called the strictly positive fragment.
Second, we slightly change the realizations so that we interpret relation symbols not
directly as formulas, but as axiomatizations of theories. As such our study follows a
recent development of strictly positive logics in general (such as [17]) and reflection
calculi in particular (see [8], [4], and [9]).
Japaridze [16] generalized the logic GL to a polymodal version called GLP, and
Beklemishev [2] generalized this further to a transfinite setting yielding GLPΛ, where
for each ordinal ξ < Λ there is a provability modality [ξ], and larger ordinals refer to
stronger provability notions. The logic GLPω has been successfully used in performing
a modular ordinal analysis of PA and related systems (see [1], and more recently [6]). A
key feature in the ordinal analysis is that consistency operators 〈n〉 can be interpreted
as reflection principles, which are finitely axiomatizable.
However, an interpretation of limit modalities like 〈ω〉 would require non finitely
axiomatizable reflection schemata. One way to overcome this problem is by resorting
to what was coined the Reflection Calculus [8], [3] and its transfinite version RCΛ [11].
Reflection calculi only allow strictly positive formulas based solely on propositional
variables, a verum constant, consistency operators and conjunctions. As such, the
arithmetical realizations as above can be taken to be arithmetical theories instead of
arithmetical formulas.
The logic QRC1 we present in this paper follows this set-up: we will work with
sequents of the form ϕ ⊢ ψ where both ϕ and ψ are strictly positive formulas built up
from ⊤, predicate symbols, conjunction, universal quantification and the ♦ modality.
The latter will refer to the usual notion of formal consistency and predicate symbols
1We refrain from distinguishing a formula ϕ from its Go¨del number pϕq.
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are interpreted as theories parametrized by the free variables.
Independently of the reflection calculi, other strictly positive modal logics were
studied because of their computational desirable properties when compared to their
non-strict counterparts (see [17] for an example). In this line, the logic RC can be seen
as a PTIME decidable fragment of the PSPACE complete logic GLP (shown in [8]). If
indeed the logic QRC1 we present in this paper turns out to be arithmetically complete,
this would yield, in a sense, a shift from undecidability (Π02-complete) to decidability
when resorting to a strictly positive reflection fragment.
2 Quantified Reflection Calculus with one modality
The Quantified Reflection Calculus with one modality, or QRC1, is a sequent logic in a
predicate modal language that is strictly positive.
Towards describing the language of QRC1, we fix a countable set of variables x0, . . .
(also referred to as x, y, z, etc.) and define a signature Σ as a set of constants and a
set of relation symbols with corresponding arity (we have no function symbols). We
use the letters c, ci, . . . to refer to constants and the letters S, Si, . . . to refer to relation
symbols.
Given a signature, a term t is either a variable or a constant of that signature. Both
⊤ and any n-ary relation symbol applied to n terms are atomic formulas. The set
of formulas is the closure of the atomic formulas under the binary connective ∧, the
unary modal operator ♦, and the quantifier ∀x, where x is a variable. Formulas are
represented by Greek letters such as ϕ, ψ, χ, etc.
The free variables of a formula are defined as usual. The expression ϕ[x←t] denotes
the formula ϕ with all free occurrences of the variable x simultaneously replaced by the
term t. We say that t is free for x in ϕ if no occurrence of a free variable in t becomes
bound in ϕ[x←t].
Definition 2.1. Let Σ be a signature and ϕ, ψ, and χ be any formulas in that language.
The axioms and rules of QRC1 are the following:
(i) ϕ ⊢ ⊤ and ϕ ⊢ ϕ;
(ii) ϕ ∧ ψ ⊢ ϕ and ϕ ∧ ψ ⊢ ψ;
(iii) if ϕ ⊢ ψ and ϕ ⊢ χ, then
ϕ ⊢ ψ ∧ χ;
(iv) if ϕ ⊢ ψ and ψ ⊢ χ, then ϕ ⊢ χ;
(v) if ϕ ⊢ ψ, then ♦ϕ ⊢ ♦ψ;
(vi) ♦♦ϕ ⊢ ♦ϕ;
(vii) ♦ ∀ xϕ ⊢ ∀ x♦ϕ;
(viii) if ϕ ⊢ ψ, then ϕ ⊢ ∀ xψ
(x /∈ fv(ϕ));
(ix) if ϕ[x←t] ⊢ ψ then ∀ xϕ ⊢ ψ
(t free for x in ϕ);
(x) if ϕ ⊢ ψ, then ϕ[x←t] ⊢ ψ[x←t]
(t free for x in ϕ and ψ);
(xi) if ϕ[x←c] ⊢ ψ[x←c], then ϕ ⊢ ψ
(c not in ϕ nor ψ).
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If ϕ ⊢ ψ, we say that ψ follows from ϕ in QRC1. When the signature is not clear
from the context, we write ϕ ⊢Σ ψ instead.
We observe that our axioms do not include a universal quantifier elimination. How-
ever, this and various other rules are readily available via the following easy lemma.
Lemma 2.2. The following are theorems (or derivable rules) of QRC1:
(i) ∀x ∀ y ϕ ⊢ ∀ y ∀ xϕ;
(ii) ∀xϕ ⊢ ϕ[x←t] (t free for x in ϕ);
(iii) ∀xϕ ⊢ ∀ y ϕ[x←y] (y free for x in ϕ and y /∈ fv(ϕ));
(iv) if ϕ ⊢ ψ, then ϕ ⊢ ψ[x←t] (x not free in ϕ and t free for x in ψ);
(v) if ϕ ⊢ ψ[x←c], then ϕ ⊢ ∀ xψ (x not free in ϕ and c not in ϕ nor ψ).
Proof.
(i) Starting from ϕ ⊢ ϕ, apply Rule 2.1.(ix) twice (noting that a variable is always
free for itself), concluding ∀x ∀ y ϕ ⊢ ϕ. Now neither x or y is free in the left-
hand-side, so use Rule 2.1.(viii) twice to obtain ∀ x ∀ y ϕ ⊢ ∀ y ∀ xϕ, as desired.
(ii) By Rule 2.1.(ix) applied to ϕ[x←t] ⊢ ϕ[x←t].
(iii) By Rule 2.1.(viii) applied to Lemma 2.2.(ii).
(iv) Observe that, since x is not free in ϕ, we have ϕ ⊢ ∀ xψ by Rule 2.1.(viii). We
also have ∀ xψ ⊢ ψ[x←t] by 2.2.(ii), which is enough by Rule 2.1.(iv).
(v) This is a consequence of Rule 2.1.(xi) when x is not free in ϕ and Rule 2.1.(viii).
In order to analyze various aspects of our calculus we define two complexity measures
on formulas.
Definition 2.3. Given a formula ϕ, its modal depth d♦(ϕ) is defined inductively as
follows:
• d♦(⊤) := d♦(S(x0, . . . , xn−1)) := 0;
• d♦(ψ ∧ χ) := max{d♦(ψ), d♦(χ)};
• d♦(∀ xψ) := d♦(ψ);
• d♦(♦ψ) := d♦(ψ) + 1.
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Given a finite set of formulas Γ, its modal depth is d♦(Γ) := maxϕ∈Γ{d♦(ϕ)}.
The definition of quantifier depth d∀ is analogous except for:
• d∀(∀ xψ) = d∀(ψ) + 1; and
• d∀(♦ψ) = d∀(ψ).
The modal depth provides a necessary condition for derivability, proven by an easy
induction on ϕ ⊢ ψ.
Lemma 2.4. If ϕ ⊢ ψ, then d♦(ϕ) ≥ d♦(ψ).
In particular, we get irreflexivity for free as stated in the next result. For other
calculi this usually requires hard work via either modal or arithmetical semantics [5],
[10], [12].
Corollary 2.5. For any formula ϕ, we have ϕ 6⊢ ♦ϕ.
The following lemma tells us that adding constants to our signature does not
strengthen the calculus.
Lemma 2.6. Let Σ be a signature and let C be a collection of new constants not
yet occurring in Σ. By ΣC we denote the signature obtained by including these new
constants C in Σ. Let ϕ, ψ be formulas in the language of Σ. Then, if ϕ ⊢ΣC ψ, so does
ϕ ⊢Σ ψ.
Proof. This is a standard result and a proof for a calculus similar to ours can be found
in Section 1.8 of [13]. The idea is to replace every constant from C appearing in the
proof of ϕ ⊢ΣC ψ by a fresh variable. It can easily be seen that axioms are mapped
to axioms under this replacement, and that the rules are also mapped correctly. The
most interesting case is that of the generalization of constants rule, because replacing
new constants by variables in the premise ϕ[x←c] ⊢ΣC ψ[x←c] may leave us unable to
apply the same rule. Fortunately the term instantiation rule (Rule 2.1.(x)) suffices to
complete the proof.
3 Arithmetical semantics
In this section we look at the intended arithmetical reading of the logic QRC1. We
consider mathematical theories in the language {0, 1,+,×,≤,=} of arithmetic. We
refer the reader to [14] for details and definitions. We recall that bounded formulas
are those formulas where each quantifier occurs bounded as in ∀y ≤ t, where y does
not occur in t. The Σ1 formulas are those that arise by existential quantification of
bounded formulas. Sets of numbers that can be defined by a Σ1 formula are called c.e.
for computably enumerable.
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The theory IΣ1 contains the defining axioms for our constants and function symbols,
say as in Robinson’s arithmetic, and moreover allows induction for Σ1 formulas. It is
well-known that IΣ1 proves Σ1-collection, that is:
∀ x<z ∃ y ϕ(x, y)→ ∃ y0 ∀ x<z ∃ y<y0 ϕ(x, y).
For the sake of an easy exposition we shall assume that all the theories we work with
extend IΣ1. By τ(x) we denote the elementary formula that presents the standard
axiomatization of IΣ1. That is to say, N |= τ(n) if and only if n is the Go¨del number
of an axiom of IΣ1.
In the arithmetical interpretation of the propositional logic RC, the propositional
variables are mapped to (axiomatizations of) theories, and the conjunction of two the-
ories is interpreted as the union of both theories (corresponding to a disjunction in the
sense of either being an axiom of the one or of the other). The arithmetical interpreta-
tion of each diamond modality is a consistency notion.
We will fix a provability predicate αϕ formalizing the existence of a Hilbert-style
proof, which is a sequence of formulas the last of which is ϕ and such that each element
of the sequence is either a logical axiom, an axiom in the sense of α, or the result of
applying a rule to earlier elements in the sequence. We denote the dual consistency
notion by Conα(ψ) and sometimes write Conα instead of Conα(⊤). The following lemma
is standard for Σ1 axiomatizations α and the reader can consult [7] for details.
Lemma 3.1. For any Σ1 formula α, we have that
(i) IΣ1 ⊢ Conα(Conα)→ Conα;
(ii) IΣ1 ⊢ ∃ zαϕ→ α ∃ z ϕ.
If we now interpret relation symbols from QRC1 as theories (parametrized by the
free variables), then a universal quantification (which can be conceived of as an infinite
conjunction) will be interpreted as an infinite union/disjunction, that is, an existential
quantifier. These observations are reflected in Definition 3.2 below.
In this section, we reserve the variables xi for variables in QRC1, and the variables
yi, zi and u are reserved for the arithmetic language with the understanding that the yi
interpret the QRC1-constants ci and the zi interpret the QRC1-variables xi. The variable
u is reserved for (Go¨del numbers of) axioms of the theories that we denote.
Definition 3.2. A realization ∗ takes n-ary predicate symbols in the language of QRC1
to (n + 1)-ary Σ1-formulas in the language of arithmetic, each representing a set of
axioms of theories indexed by n parameters. In particular, a realization ∗ is such that
S(c,x)∗ = σ(y, z, u) for some Σ1 formula σ such that for each concrete numerical
values for y, z we have that N |= σ(y, z, u) if and only if u is the Go¨del number of
an axiom of the intended corresponding theory. When we use the vector notation in
S(c,x)∗ = σ(y, z, u) we understand that y matches with c and z matches with x, and
thus if, say, yi occurs in σ, then ci occurs in S(c,x).
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We extend a given realization ∗ to ()∗ on any formula of QRC1 as follows:
• (⊤)∗ := τ(u);
• (S(c,x))∗ := S(c,x)∗ ∨ τ(u);
•
(
ψ(c,x) ∧ δ(c,x)
)∗
:=
(
ψ(c,x)
)∗
∨
(
δ(c,x)
)∗
;
•
(
♦ψ(c,x)
)∗
:= τ(u) ∨ (u = pCon(ψ(c,x))∗q);
•
(
∀ xi ψ(c,x)
)∗
:= ∃ zi
(
ψ(c,x)
)∗
.
From now on we omit outer brackets, using the same notation for ∗ and ()∗. This may
lead to confusion for predicate symbols, but the context should tell us which reading to
use. We fix the notation ψ(c,x)∗ = ψ∗(y, z) suppressing mention of u when convenient.
Let T be a c.e. theory in the language of arithmetic which extends IΣ1. We define
(recall that χ∗ will in general depend on y and z):
QRC1(T ) = {ϕ(c,x) ⊢ ψ(c,x) | ∀
∗ T ⊢ ∀ θ ∀y ∀ z (ψ∗θ→ ϕ∗θ)}.
In the above we assume that all the free variables other than u in ψ∗∧ϕ∗ are among the
y and z. The θ are sentences without free variables. Furthermore, we stress that all
realizations map to Σ1 formulas (modulo provable equivalence). We defer the question
of whether QRC1 = QRC1(T ) for any sound c.e. T containing IΣ1 to a future paper
and prove here only the soundness inclusion.
Theorem 3.3 (Arithmetical soundness). QRC1 ⊆ QRC1(IΣ1).
Proof. We proceed by (an external) induction on the proof of ϕ ⊢ ψ. We shall briefly
comment on some of the cases. The case of the axiom ϕ ⊢ ⊤ is clear since by an easy
induction on ϕ we van prove that over predicate logic ϕ∗(y, z, u) ↔ τ(u) ∨ ϕ′(y, z, u)
for some formula ϕ′. The axioms ϕ∧ψ ⊢ ϕ are easily seen to be sound since (ϕ∧ψ)∗ =
ϕ∗ ∨ ψ∗, that is, the formula that defines the union of two axiom sets.
The rule that if ϕ ⊢ ψ and ψ ⊢ χ, then ϕ ⊢ χ is straightforward but the rule that
if ϕ ⊢ ψ and ϕ ⊢ χ, then ϕ ⊢ ψ ∧ χ is slightly more tricky. To see the soundness, we
fix a particular realization ∗ and reason in IΣ1. Inside IΣ1 we fix arbitrary y, z and θ
and assume (ψ∧χ)∗(y,z)θ, that is, ψ∗(y,z)∨χ∗(y,z)θ. Thus, ψ∗(y,z)
(∧
ξi → θ
)
for some
collection of axioms ξi satisfying χ
∗(y, z). By the induction hypothesis on ϕ ⊢ ψ we ob-
tain ϕ∗(y,z)
(∧
ξi → θ
)
, so that τ
(∧
ξi → (
∧
ϕj → θ)
)
for some collection of axioms
ϕj satisfying ϕ
∗(y, z). Since all the ξi satisfy χ
∗(y, z) we conclude χ∗(y,z)
(∧
ϕj → θ
)
.
Using now the induction hypothesis on ϕ ⊢ χ we conclude ϕ∗(y,z)
(∧
ϕj → θ
)
whence
ϕ∗(y,z)θ as was to be shown.
We will now see the soundness of the necessitation rule, that is, if ϕ ⊢ ψ, then
♦ϕ ⊢ ♦ψ. We fix some realization ∗. The induction hypothesis for ϕ ⊢ ψ applied to
the formula ⊥ gives us IΣ1 ⊢ ∀y, z
(
ψ∗(y,z)⊥ → ϕ∗(y,z)⊥
)
, whence
IΣ1 ⊢ ∀y, z
(
Conϕ∗(y,z) → Conψ∗(y,z)
)
. (1)
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Let π be the standard proof of this. We reason in IΣ1, fixing parameters y, z, θ
and assuming (♦ψ)∗(y,z)θ. Since (♦ψ)
∗ := τ(u) ∨ (u = pConψ∗(y,z)q), we conclude
τ
(
Conψ∗(y,z) → θ
)
. We combine this proof with the proof π of (1) to conclude
τ
(
Conϕ∗(y,z) → θ
)
, whence (♦ϕ)∗(y,z)θ.
The soundness of the axiom ♦♦ϕ ⊢ ♦ϕ is similar, now using Lemma 3.1.(i) instead
of (1).
To see the soundness of the axiom ♦ ∀ xi ϕ ⊢ ∀ xi ♦ϕ we start by proving a First
Claim:
IΣ1 ⊢ Con(∀xi ϕ)∗(y,z) → ∀ ziConϕ∗(y,z). (2)
To prove this, we reason in IΣ1 and assume ∃ ziϕ∗(y,z)⊥, whence for some number ζ
we have that ϕ∗(y,z)[zi←ζ]⊥. Then a slight variation of Lemma 3.1.(ii) allows us to see
that ∃ zi ϕ∗(y,z)⊥, and thus (∀ xi ϕ)∗(y,z)⊥.
We now prove a Second Claim:
IΣ1 ⊢ (∀ xi ♦ϕ)∗(y,z)δ → τ(u)∨(u=p∀xiConϕ∗(y,z)q) δ. (3)
We observe (∀xi ♦ϕ)
∗(y, z) = ∃ zi (♦ϕ)
∗(y, z) = ∃ zi
(
τ(u)∨u=pConϕ∗(y,z)q
)
, the latter
being provably equivalent to τ(u)∨ ∃ zi
(
u=pConϕ∗(y,z)q
)
. To prove the Second Claim,
we reason in IΣ1 and assume the antecedent (∀ xi ♦ϕ)∗(y,z)δ fixing some y, z, δ. Thus,
we find a collection of numbers ζj such that τ
(∧
j Conϕ∗(y,z)[zi←ζj ] → δ
)
. Clearly,
τ
(
∀ ziConϕ∗(y,z) →
∧
j Conϕ∗(y,z)[zj←ζj ]
)
, which suffices to prove the Second Claim.
Let us now go back the soundness of the axiom ♦ ∀ xi ϕ ⊢ ∀ xi ♦ϕ. We fix ∗, reason
in IΣ1, fix y, z, θ, and assume (∀xi ♦ϕ)∗(y,z)θ. By the Second Claim and the formalized
deduction theorem we get τ (∀ zi Conϕ∗(y,z) → θ). The First Claim now gives us
(♦ ∀xi ϕ)∗(y,z)θ as was to be shown.
The soundness of the ∀ introduction rule on the right, that if ϕ ⊢ ψ, then ϕ ⊢
∀ xi ψ (xi /∈ fv(ϕ)), is not hard but contains a subtlety. To prove it we fix ∗, rea-
son in IΣ1, fix y, z, θ and assume (∀xiψ)∗(y,z)θ. Since (∀xiψ)
∗(y, z) = ∃ziψ
∗(y, z)
we can find numbers ζj such that τ (
∧
j ψ
∗(y, z)[zi←ζj] → θ). Now by the induc-
tion hypothesis we get
∧
j ϕ∗(y,z)[zi←ζj ]ψ
∗(y, z)[zi←ζj]. Since xi /∈ fv(ϕ) we have∧
j ϕ∗(y,z)ψ
∗(y, z)[zi←ζj ]. Using Σ1-collection we obtain ϕ∗(y,z)
∧
j ψ
∗(y, z)[zi←ζj]
from which the required ϕ∗(y,z)θ follows.
The soundness of the remaining rules is straightforward and boils down to inter-
changing universal quantifiers.
4 Relational semantics
There have been several proposals for relational semantics for modal propositional log-
ics, from Kripke [18] to many others. Overviews can be found in [15] and [13]. We
essentially have first-order models glued together by an accessibility relation. Our in-
terpretation of the universal quantifiers is actualist, which means that ∀ xϕ is true at a
world w if and only if ϕ[x←d] is true at w for every d in the domain of w, i.e., for every
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entity d that exists in that world. It might happen, however, that some other world u
has a different domain, and thus that it falsifies ϕ[x←e] for some specific e.
We proceed by defining frames and relational models.
Definition 4.1. A frame F is a tuple 〈W,R, {Mw}w∈W 〉 where:
• W is a non-empty set (the set of worlds, where individual worlds are referred to
as w, u, v, etc);
• R is a binary relation on W (the accessibility relation); and
• each Mw is a finite set (the domain of the world w, whose elements are referred
to as d, d0, d1, etc).
The domain of the frame is M :=
⋃
w∈W Mw.
Definition 4.2. A relational model M in a signature Σ is a tuple 〈F , {Iw}w∈W ,
{Jw}w∈W 〉 where:
• F = 〈W,R, {Mw}w∈W 〉 is a frame;
• for each w ∈ W , the interpretation Iw assigns an element of the domain Mw to
each constant c ∈ Σ, written cIw ; and
• for each w ∈ W , the interpretation Jw is a function assigning a set of tuples
SJw ⊆ ℘((Mw)
n) to each n-ary relation symbol S ∈ Σ.
Even though we interpret the universal quantifiers in the actualist way, we cannot
allow the domains of each world to be completely unrelated to each other. This is
because we want statements such as the axiom ♦ ∀ xϕ ⊢ ∀ x♦ϕ to be sound. This
axiom forces us to have inclusive frames, which means that if w sees a world u, then
the domain of w is included or at least embedded in the domain of u. We also require
that our frames be transitive, for we want the axiom ♦♦ϕ ⊢ ♦ϕ to be sound. Finally,
the interpretation of a constant should indeed be constant throughout (the relevant part
of) any useful model. Thus, we introduce the notion of adequate frames and models.
Definition 4.3. A frame F is adequate if the accessibility relation R is:
• inclusive: if wRu, then Mw ⊆ Mu; and
• transitive: if wRu and uRv, then wRv.
A model is adequate if it is based on an adequate frame and it is:
• concordant: if wRu, then cIw = cIu for every constant c.
Note that in an adequate and rooted model the interpretation of the constants is the
same at every world.
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In order to define truth at a world in a first-order model, we use assignments. A
w-assignment g is a function assigning a member of the domain Mw to each variable in
the language. In an adequate frame, any w-assignment can be seen as a v-assignment
as long as wRv, because Mw ⊆ Mv and hence there is a trivial inclusion (or coercion)
ιw,v : Mw → Mv. If g is a such a w-assignment, we represent the corresponding v-
assignment ιw,v ◦ g by g
ι when w and v are clear from the context.
Two w-assignments g and h are Γ-alternative, denoted by g ∼Γ h, if they coincide
on all variables other than the ones in Γ. If Γ = {x}, we write x-alternative and g ∼x h.
We extend a given w-assignment g to terms by defining g(c) := cIw where c is any
constant.
Definition 4.4. LetM = 〈W,R, {Mw}w∈W , {Iw}w∈W , {Jw}w∈W 〉 be a relational model
in some signature Σ, and let w ∈ W be a world, g be a w-assignment, S be an n-ary
relation symbol, and ϕ, ψ be formulas in the language of Σ.
We define M, w g ϕ (ϕ is true at w under g) by induction on ϕ as follows.
• M, w g ⊤;
• M, w g S(t0, . . . , tn−1) iff 〈g(t0), . . . , g(tn−1)〉 ∈ S
Jw ;
• M, w g ϕ ∧ ψ iff both M, w g ϕ and M, w g ψ;
• M, w g ♦ϕ iff there is v ∈ W such that wRv and M, v g
ι
ϕ;
• M, w g ∀ xϕ iff for all w-assignments h such that h ∼x g, M, w 
h ϕ.
We now present a number of simple results needed to prove the relational soundness
of QRC1. These are standard observations about either first-order models or Kripke
models that we adapted to our case.
Remark 4.5. LetM be an adequate model, w be any world, g, h be any Γ-alternative
w-assignments, and ϕ be a formula with no free variables in Γ. Then:
M, w g ϕ ⇐⇒ M, w h ϕ.
Lemma 4.6 (Substitution in formula). Let M be an adequate model, w be a world,
and g, g˜ be x-alternative w-assignments such that g˜(x) = g(t). Then for every formula
ϕ with t free for x:
M, w g˜ ϕ ⇐⇒ M, w g ϕ[x←t].
Proof. By induction on ϕ. We only present the cases of the diamond and of the uni-
versal quantifier; the remaining cases are straightforward. We assume without loss of
generality that x is a free variable of ϕ, since otherwise we could use Remark 4.5.
Suppose that ϕ is ♦ψ and assume that M, w g˜ ♦ψ. Then there is a world v
such that wRv and M, v g˜
ι
ψ. Note that gι ∼x g˜
ι and g˜ι(x) = gι(t) (either t is a
variable and this is a consequence of g˜(x) = g(t), or t is a constant and this follows
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from tIw = tIv) and thus by the induction hypothesis M, v g
ι
ψ[x←t]. This gives us
M, w g ♦ψ[x←t], as desired. The other direction is analogous.
Suppose now that ϕ = ∀ z ψ and assume thatM, w g˜ ∀ z ψ. Note that x and z are
different variables, for otherwise x would not be free in ϕ. Let h be any w-assignment
such that h ∼z g. We wish to show M, w 
h ψ[x←t]. Define h˜ such that h˜ ∼x h and
h˜(x) := h(t). Then by the induction hypothesis we can reduce our goal to M, w h˜ ψ.
By our assumption, it is enough to check that h˜ ∼z g˜.
In order to see this, note first that h˜ ∼{x,z} h (because h˜ ∼x h). Similarly, h ∼{x,z} g
and g ∼{x,z} g˜. Then h˜ ∼{x,z} g˜ by transitivity of∼{x,z}. But g˜(x) = g(t) by assumption;
g(t) = h(t) because g ∼z h (z and t are not the same variable because otherwise t would
not be free for x in ϕ); and h(t) = h˜(x) by construction of h˜. Thus g˜(x) = h˜(x), and
h˜ ∼z g˜.
Towards the other direction, assume that M, w g (∀ z ψ)[x←t] and that x and z
are not the same variable. Let h˜ ∼z g˜ be a w-assignment. We wish to showM, w 
h˜ ψ.
Define h ∼x h˜ such that h(x) := g(x). Note that h ∼z g by the transitivity of ∼x,z
(using a similar argument to the one above). Thus we know that M, w h ψ[x←t] by
assumption. It only remains to show that h˜(x) = h(t), as we can then finally use the
induction hypothesis to finish. If t is x there is nothing to show, and t cannot be z,
because z is not free for x in ∀ z ψ. Thus, h(t) = g(t) = g˜(x) = h˜(x).
We now wish to provide counterparts to Remark 4.5 and Lemma 4.6 for when the
change happens in the interpretation of a constant instead of a variable. They are
needed to show the soundness of Rule 2.1.(xi). It is straightforward to check that the
interpretation of constants not appearing in a formula is not relevant for the truth of
that formula:
Remark 4.7. Let M and M′ be adequate models differing only in their constant
interpretations {Iw}w∈W and {I
′
w}w∈W . Let w be any world, g be any w-assignment,
and ϕ be a formula whose constants are interpreted in the same way by both M and
M′. Then
M, w g ϕ ⇐⇒ M′, w g ϕ.
However, we need a bit of work to be able to state a counterpart of Lemma 4.6 for
constants. We want to be able to replace the interpretation of a constant by an element
of the domain of some world w, but this element may not exist in the domains of the
worlds below w. Thus we need to first get rid of that part of the model and keep only
the sub-graph rooted at w.
Definition 4.8. Given a frame F = 〈W,R, {Mw}w∈W 〉 and a world r ∈ W , the frame
restricted at r, written F|r = 〈W |r, R|r, {Mw}w∈W |r〉, is defined as the restriction of F
to the world r and all the worlds accessible from r by R. Thus, W |r := {r} ∪ {w ∈
W | rRw}, and the relation R|r is R restricted to W |r.
IfM = 〈F , {Iw}w∈W , {Jw}w∈W 〉 is a model, thenM|r is defined as 〈F|r, {Iw}w∈W |r ,
{Jw}w∈W |r〉.
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Remark 4.9. If F is an adequate frame, then so is F|r for any r ∈ W . Furthermore,
if M is an adequate model, then so is M|r.
Remark 4.10. Given an adequate modelM and a world r ∈ W , we have that for any
formula ϕ, any world w ∈ Wr and any w-assignment g:
M, w g ϕ ⇐⇒ M|r, w 
g ϕ.
Definition 4.11. Given an adequate model M = 〈F , {Iw}w∈W , {Jw}w∈W 〉, a world
r ∈ W , a constant c, and an element of the domain d ∈ Mr, we define M|r[c←d] :=
〈F|r, {I
′
w}w∈W |r , {Jw}w∈W |r〉 such that its frame is F truncated at r, the relational
symbols interpretation and the interpretation of all constants except for c coincides
with that of M|r, and the interpretation c
I′w of the constant c is d for every w ∈ W |r.
Lemma 4.12. Given a constant c, a formula ϕ where c does not appear, an adequate
model M, a world w, and a w-assignment g, we have:
M, w g ϕ ⇐⇒ M|w[c←g(x)], w 
g ϕ[x←c].
Proof. We proceed by induction on the formula ϕ. The cases of ⊤, relational symbols,
and conjunction are trivial. We assume that x is free in ϕ, for otherwise we could use
Remarks 4.7 and 4.10.
Consider the diamond case. If M, w g ♦ψ, then there is a world v such that wRv
and M, v g
ι
ψ. By the induction hypothesis we obtain M|v[c←g
ι(x)], v g
ι
ψ[x←c].
Observe that M|v[c←g
ι(x)] is the same model as (M|w[c←g(x)])|v, since they share
the same frame, the same constant interpretation (because g(x) = gι(x)) and the same
relational symbol interpretation. Then by Remark 4.10 we get M|w[c←g(x)], v 
gι
ψ[x←c] and consequentlyM|w[c←g(x)] 
g ♦ψ[x←c], as desired. The other implication
is analogous.
Finally, let ϕ = ∀ z ψ and assume thatM, w g ∀ z ψ. Let h ∼z g be a w-assignment,
and set out to prove M|w[c←g(x)], w 
h ψ[x←c] (note that z and x are not the same
variable for otherwise x would not be free in ϕ). Since h ∼z g, we know that g(x) = h(x),
so by the induction hypothesis it is enough to showM, w h ψ, which follows from our
assumption. The other implication is analogous.
We are finally ready to prove that QRC1 is sound with respect to the relational
semantics presented above.
Theorem 4.13 (Relational soundness). If ϕ ⊢ ψ, then for any adequate model M, for
any world w ∈ W , and for any w-assignment g:
M, w g ϕ =⇒ M, w g ψ.
Proof. By induction on the proof of ϕ ⊢ ψ.
In the case of the axioms ϕ ⊢ ⊤ and ϕ ⊢ ϕ, the result is clear, as it is for the
conjunction elimination axioms. The conjunction introduction and cut rules follow
easily from the definitions.
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For the necessitation rule assume the result for ϕ ⊢ ψ and further assume that
M, w g ♦ϕ. Then there is a world v such that wRv and M, v g
ι
ϕ. We wish to see
M, w g ♦ψ. Taking v as a suitable witness, our goal changes to M, v g
ι
ψ. Thus
the induction hypothesis for v and gι finishes the proof.
For the transitivity axiom, ♦♦ϕ ⊢ ♦ϕ, assume that M, w g ♦♦ϕ. Then there is a
world v such that wRv and M, v ιw,v◦g ♦ϕ, and also a subsequent world u such that
vRu and M, u ιv,u◦(ιw,v◦g) ϕ. Observing that ιv,u ◦ (ιw,v ◦ g) is the same as ιw,u ◦ g,
we get M, u ιw,u◦g ψ, and the transitivity of R provides wRu, which is enough to see
M, w g ♦ϕ, as desired.
In the case of ♦ ∀ xϕ ⊢ ∀ x♦ϕ, assume that M, w g ♦ ∀xϕ. Then there is v ∈ W
such that wRv and for every v-assignment h with h ∼x g
ι we have M, v h ϕ. Let f
be any w-assignment such that f ∼x g. Taking v as a suitable world seen by w, we
wish to check that M, v f
ι
ϕ. By assumption, it is enough to see f ι ∼x g
ι, and this
follows from f ∼x g.
For the ∀-introduction rule on the right, assume the result for ϕ ⊢ ψ[x←y] with
x 6∈ fv(ϕ) and y free for x in ψ. Assume further that M, w g ϕ. Let h be a w-
assignment such that h ∼x g. We wish to see that M, w 
h ψ. Since x is not a free
variable in ϕ, we know that M, w h ϕ by Remark 4.5. The result follows from the
induction hypothesis with w-assignment h.
Consider now the ∀-introduction rule on the left. Assume the result for ϕ[x←t] ⊢ ψ
with t free for x in ϕ and assume further that M, w g ∀ xϕ. Then for every w-
assignment h such that h ∼x g we haveM, w 
h ϕ. Define h ∼x g such that h(x) = g(t).
We obtain M, w g ψ by the induction hypothesis and Lemma 4.6.
The term instantiation rule, that if ϕ ⊢ ψ then ϕ[x←t] ⊢ ψ[x←t] with t free for x
in ϕ and in ψ, is sound by Lemma 4.6.
Finally, consider the generalization on constants rule and assume the result for
ϕ[x←c] ⊢ ψ[x←c], where c does not appear in ϕ nor in ψ. Assume further that
M, w g ϕ. By Lemma 4.12 we know that M|w[c←g(x)], w 
g ϕ[x←c], and thus by
the induction hypothesis that M|w[c←g(x)], w 
g ψ[x←c]. This allows us to conclude
M, w g ψ by the same lemma.
5 Relational completeness
We now wish to prove the relational completeness of QRC1. For every underivable
sequent we provide a model that doesn’t satisfy it. These models are term models
where the worlds are akin to maximal consistent sets. However, since we have no way
to express negative formulas, each world is a pair of sets of formulas instead: the set of
positive formulas at that world and the set of negative ones.
We start by defining some notions about pairs of formulas, and we write p, q, . . . to
refer to generic pairs that may not have all the necessary properties to be a world in
a term model. Given a pair of sets p, the first set is the positive set, or p+, and the
second one is the negative set, or p−.
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Definition 5.1. Given a set of formulas Γ and a formula ϕ, we say that ϕ follows from
Γ, and write Γ ⊢ ϕ, if there are formulas γ0, . . . , γn ∈ Γ such that γ0 ∧ · · · ∧ γn ⊢ ϕ.
Definition 5.2. Let Φ be a set of formulas.
• A Φ-extension of a pair p = 〈p+, p−〉 is a pair q = 〈q+, q−〉 such that p+ ⊆ q+ ⊆ Φ
and p− ⊆ q− ⊆ Φ. In that case we write p ⊆ q ⊆ Φ.
• A pair p is consistent if for every δ ∈ p− we have p+ 6⊢ δ.
• A pair p ⊆ Φ is Φ-maximal consistent if it is consistent and there is no consistent
Φ-extension of p.
• A pair p is fully witnessed if for every formula ∀ xϕ ∈ p− there is a constant c
such that ϕ[x←c] ∈ p−.
• A pair p is Φ-MCW if it is Φ-maximal consistent and fully witnessed.
Lemma 5.3. A pair p is Φ-maximal consistent if and only if it is consistent and for
every ϕ ∈ Φ either ϕ ∈ p+ or ϕ ∈ p−.
Proof. The right-to-left implication is obvious. To check the other one assume that p is
Φ-maximal consistent and let ϕ ∈ Φ. If p+ ⊢ ϕ, then 〈p+ ∪ {ϕ}, p−〉 is still consistent,
and thus by maximality it must be that ϕ ∈ p+. If on the other hand p+ 6⊢ ϕ, then
〈p+, p− ∪ {ϕ}〉 is consistent, and thus we may conclude ϕ ∈ p−.
Definition 5.4. Given a set of constants C, the closure of a formula ϕ under C,
written CℓC(ϕ), is defined by induction on the formula as such: CℓC(⊤) := {⊤};
CℓC(S(t0, . . . , tn−1) := {S(t0, . . . , tn−1)),⊤}; CℓC(ϕ∧ψ) := {ϕ∧ψ} ∪ CℓC(ϕ)∪ CℓC(ψ);
CℓC(♦ϕ) := {♦ϕ} ∪ CℓC(ϕ); and
CℓC(∀ xϕ) := {∀ xϕ} ∪
⋃
c∈C
CℓC(ϕ[x←c]).
The closure under C of a set of formulas Γ is the union of the closures under C of
each of the formulas in Γ:
CℓC(Γ) :=
⋃
γ∈Γ
CℓC(γ).
The closure of a pair p is defined as the closure of p+ ∪ p−.
Note that the closure of a set of closed formulas is itself a set of closed formulas. We
often use the concept of closure under a set of constants on an already Φ-maximal pair
when we wish to extend the signature of the formulas in Φ with a new set of constants.
Given a consistent pair p, we wish to generate a Φ-maximal consistent and fully
witnessed extension of p, for some set of formulas Φ. In the usual Henkin construction
this is traditionally accomplished in two steps: first extend the signature to include
a constant for each existential statement and add every closed formula of the form
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∃xϕ → ϕ[x←cϕ] to your set, proving that this didn’t break consistency. Then prove
a Lindenbaum lemma to the effect that consistent sets can be extended to maximal
consistent sets. The resulting sets will be maximal, consistent, and fully witnessed.
However we can not do this because we cannot express implications. Thus if we were
to add a witness for every existential formula in our original pair p (read: universal
formula in p−) and then use a Lindenbaum lemma to make it maximal, there could be
new existential formulas without witnesses. We might have to iterate the process over
and over again, or at least a proof of termination would be non-trivial. Fortunately,
this isn’t needed. We can manage with a finite set of witnesses, as is shown by the
following lemma.
Lemma 5.5. Given a finite signature Σ with constants C, a finite set of closed formulas
Φ in the language of Σ and a consistent pair p ⊆ CℓC(Φ), there is a finite set of constants
D ⊇ C and a pair q ⊇ p in the language of Σ extended byD such that q is CℓD(Φ)-MCW
and d♦(q
+) = d♦(p
+).
Proof. Let N := {c0, . . . , cd∀(Φ)−1} and D := C ∪N .
Let q0 := p. For every formula ϕi in CℓD(Φ), if p
+ ⊢ ϕi, define qi+1 = 〈q
+
i ∪{ϕi}, q
−
i 〉;
otherwise define qi+1 = 〈q
+
i , q
−
i ∪ {ϕi}〉. Let q := qn, where n is the size of CℓD(Φ), i.e.,
q is what we have at the final iteration of this process.
Now assume by way of contradiction that q is not consistent, and let ψ ∈ q− be
such that q+ ⊢ ψ. Note that for every χ ∈ q+ we know that p+ ⊢ χ, because this
was the required condition to add χ to q+ in the first place. Thus, it must be that
p+ ⊢ ψ. But then the algorithm would have placed ψ in q+ instead of q− and we reach
a contradiction. We conclude that q is consistent.
Lemma 5.3 tells us that q is CℓD(Φ)-maximal consistent, because every formula of
CℓD(Φ) is either in q
+ or q−.
On the other hand, we know by Lemma 2.4 that d♦(q
+) ≤ d♦(p
+) because every
formula in q+ is a consequence of p+. We obtain the equality by observing that p+ ⊆ q+.
It remains to show that q is fully witnessed. Let ∀ xψ be a formula in q−. We
claim that there is ci ∈ N such that ci does not appear in ∀ xψ. The constants in N
are new, so the only way to have a formula χ ∈ CℓD(Φ) with a constant cj ∈ N is
if the formula ∀ y χ[cj←y] is also in CℓD(Φ), for some variable y that does not appear
(free) in χ. Assume then that all the constants in N appear in ψ. Then the formula
∀ y0 · · · ∀ ym−1 ∀ xψ[csm−1←ym−1] · · · [cs0←y0] must be in CℓD(Φ) for some variables yi
and permutation s of the numbers between 0 and m−1. But this formula has quantifier
depth m + 1, which is a contradiction because the closure under any set of constants
doesn’t change the depth of a set of formulas.
Let then ∀ xψ ∈ q− and ci ∈ N be a constant that does not appear in ∀ xψ.
Then we claim that ψ[x←ci] ∈ q
−. Assume it is not the case. Then it must be that
p+ ⊢ ψ[x←ci]. Note that ci does not appear in p
+ and that x is not a free variable of
p+ due to it being a set of closed formulas. Then by Lemma 2.2.(v) we obtain that
p+ ⊢ ∀ xψ, which is a contradiction.
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The next step is to link maximal consistent and fully witnessed pairs together
through a relation that respects the diamond formulas in the pair. To that end we
define Rˆ and prove some properties about it.
Definition 5.6. The relation Rˆ between pairs is such that pRˆq if and only if both of
following hold:
(i) for any formula ♦ϕ ∈ p− we have ϕ,♦ϕ ∈ q−; and
(ii) there is some formula ♦ψ ∈ p+ ∩ q−.
Lemma 5.7. The relation Rˆ restricted to consistent pairs is transitive and irreflexive.
Proof. In order to see that Rˆ is transitive, assume that pRˆqRˆr. We wish to see that pRˆr.
Let ♦ϕ ∈ p− be arbitrary. Then ♦ϕ ∈ q− because pRˆq, and then ϕ,♦ϕ ∈ r− because
qRˆr. Let now ♦ψ ∈ p+ ∩ q−. Since qRˆr we know that ♦ψ ∈ r−. Then ♦ψ ∈ p+ ∩ r−.
Regarding irreflexivity, suppose that there is a pair p such that pRˆp. Then there
must be ♦ψ ∈ p+ ∩ p−, which contradicts the consistency of p.
There is an equivalent formulation of Rˆ by looking at the positive sets.
Lemma 5.8. Given a set of formulas Φ, two sets of constants C ⊆ D, and pairs p, q
such that p is CℓC(Φ)-maximal consistent and q is CℓD(Φ)-maximal consistent, we have
that pRˆq if and only if both of the following hold:
(i) for every formula ♦ϕ ∈ CℓC(Φ), if either ϕ ∈ q
+ or ♦ϕ ∈ q+, then ♦ϕ ∈ p+; and
(ii) there is some formula ♦ψ ∈ p+ ∩ q−.
Proof. Assume that pRˆq and let ♦ϕ ∈ CℓC(Φ) be such that either ϕ ∈ q
+ or ♦ϕ ∈ q+.
Assume by contradiction that ♦ϕ /∈ p+. Then by Lemma 5.3 we know that ♦ϕ ∈ p−.
Thus since pRˆq, we obtain both ϕ ∈ q− and ♦ϕ ∈ q−. But this contradicts the
consistency of q. The last condition holds by the definition of Rˆ.
Assume now that these conditions hold, towards checking that pRˆq. Only the first
condition is in question. Let ♦ϕ ∈ p− and assume that ϕ /∈ q−. By Lemma 5.3, it
must be that ϕ ∈ q+. Then ♦ϕ ∈ p+, which contradicts the consistency of p. Assume
now that ♦ϕ /∈ q−. By the same token, ♦ϕ must be in q+. Then ♦ϕ ∈ p+, reaching a
contradiction again.
The following lemma states that, given a suitable pair p where ♦ϕ holds, we can
find a second suitable pair q where ϕ holds such that pRˆq.
Lemma 5.9 (Pair existence). Let Σ be a signature with a finite set of constants C,
and Φ be a finite set of closed formulas in the language of Σ. If p is a CℓC(Φ)-MCW
pair and ♦ϕ ∈ p+, then there is a finite set of constants D ⊇ C and a CℓD(Φ)-MCW
pair q such that pRˆq, ϕ ∈ q+, and d♦(q
+) < d♦(p
+).
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Proof. Consider the pair r = 〈{ϕ}, {δ,♦δ | ♦δ ∈ p−} ∪ {♦ϕ}〉. Assume that r is not
consistent, and thus that there is a formula ψ ∈ r− such that ϕ ⊢ ψ. It cannot be that
ψ is ♦ϕ due to Lemma 2.5. Thus there is ♦δ ∈ p− such that either ϕ ⊢ δ or ϕ ⊢ ♦δ.
By Rule 2.1.(v) we get either ♦ϕ ⊢ ♦δ or ♦ϕ ⊢ ♦♦δ, which also implies ♦ϕ ⊢ ♦δ by
Axiom 2.1.(vi). This contradicts the consistency of p, which leads us to conclude that
r is consistent.
We can now use Lemma 5.5 to obtain a finite set of constants D ⊇ C and a CℓD(Φ)-
MCW pair q ⊇ r such that d♦(q
+) = d♦(r
+) = d♦(ϕ) < d♦(p
+).
It remains to show that pRˆq, but this is clear by the definition of r: for every
♦δ ∈ p−, the formulas δ and ♦δ are in r− (and hence in q−), and the formula ♦ϕ is
both in p+ and in q−.
We are now ready to define an adequate model M[p] from any given finite and
consistent pair p such that M[p] satisfies the formulas in p+ and doesn’t satisfy the
formulas in p−. The idea is to build a term model where each world w is a CℓMw(p)-
MCW pair, and the worlds are related by (a sub-relation of) Rˆ. The worlds in this
model will be pairs of formulas in different signatures, as we will add new constants
every time we create a new world. However, the model is intended to satisfy only
formulas in the original signature of p.
Definition 5.10. Given a finite consistent pair p of closed formulas with constants in
a finite set C, we define an adequate model M[p].
We start by defining the underlying frame in an iterative manner. The root is given
by Lemma 5.5 applied to C and p, obtaining D and q. Frame F0 is then defined such
that its set of worlds is W 0 := {q}, its relation R0 is empty, and the domain of q is
M0q := D.
Assume now that we already have a frame F i, and we set out to define F i+1 as
an extension of F i. For each leaf w of F i, i.e., each world such that there is no world
v ∈ F i with wRiv, and for each formula ♦ϕ ∈ w+, use Lemma 5.9 to obtain a finite set
E ⊇ M iw and a CℓE(w)-MCW pair v such that wRˆv, ϕ ∈ v
+, and d♦(v
+) < d♦(w
+).
Now add v to W i+1, add 〈w, v〉 to Ri+1, and define M i+1v as E.
The process described above terminates because each pair is finite and the modal
depth of p+ (and consequently of CℓX(p) for any set X) is also finite. Thus there is
a final frame Fd♦(p
+). This frame is inclusive by construction, but not transitive. We
obtain F [p] as the transitive closure of Fd♦(p
+), which can be easily seen to still be
inclusive. Thus the frame F [p] is adequate.
In order to obtain the model M[p] based on the frame F [p], let Iq take constants
in C to their corresponding version as domain elements and if w is any other world,
let Iw coincide with Iq. This is necessary to make sure that the model is concordant,
because q sees every other world, and is sufficient to see thatM[p] is adequate. Finally,
given an n-ary predicate letter S and a world w, define SJw as the set of n-tuples
〈d0, . . . , dn−1〉 ⊆ (Mw)
n such that S(d0, . . . , dn−1) ∈ w
+.
Lemma 5.11. Let p be as above. The following are properties of F [p] = 〈W,R,
{Mw}w∈W 〉 and M[p] = 〈F [p], {Iw}w∈W , {Jw}w∈W 〉:
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(i) Every world w ∈ W is CℓMw(p)-maximal consistent and fully witnessed.
(ii) For every world w ∈ W , we have ⊤ ∈ w+.
(iii) For any two worlds w, u ∈ W , if wRu, then wRˆu.
Proof. These are simple consequences of the definition of M[p]. For the last one, note
that R is the transitive closure of Rd♦(p
+). If wRd♦(p
+)u, then wRˆu by construction.
The result then follows by the transitivity of Rˆ (Lemma 5.7).
We are almost ready to state the truth lemma, which roughly states that provability
at a world w ofM[p] is the same as membership in w+. However, the signatures of the
worlds of M[p] are more expressive than the signature of the formulas we care about.
Furthermore, all the formulas in the worlds ofM[p] are closed, while formulas in general
may have free variables. In order to deal with this, we replace the free variables of a
formula with constants in the appropriate signature first.
Definition 5.12. Given a formula ϕ in a signature Σ and a function g from the set of
variables to a set of constants in some signature Σ′ ⊇ Σ, we define the formula ϕg in
the signature Σ′ as ϕ with each free variable x simultaneously replaced by g(x).
Lemma 5.13 (Truth lemma). Let Σ be a signature with a finite set of constants C. For
any finite non-empty consistent pair p of closed formulas in the language of Σ, world
w ∈M[p], w-assignment g, and formula ϕ in the language of Σ such that ϕg ∈ CℓMw(p),
we have that
M[p], w g ϕ ⇐⇒ ϕg ∈ w+.
Proof. By induction on ϕ. The cases of ⊤ and conjunction are straightforward, so we
focus on the other ones.
In the case of the relational symbols, we can take ϕ = S(x, c) without loss of
generality, where c ∈ C. Note that M[p], w g S(x, c) if and only if 〈g(x), cIw〉 ∈ SJw ,
if and only if S(g(x), cIw) ∈ w+. Since c ∈ C, we know by the definition of M[p] that
cIw = c. Thus, we conclude that M[p], w g S(x, c) if an only if S(g(x), c) ∈ w+, as
desired.
Consider now the case of the universal quantifier. For the left to right implica-
tion, suppose that M[p], w g ∀ xϕ. Then for every w-assignment h ∼x g we have
M[p], w h ϕ. Thus for each such h we know that ϕh ∈ w+ by the induction hypothe-
sis (ϕh ∈ CℓMw(p) because (∀ xϕ)
g ∈ CℓMw(p)). We want to show that (∀ xϕ)
g ∈ w+,
i.e., that ∀ xϕg\x ∈ w+. Assume by contradiction that this is not the case. Then, since
w is CℓMw(p)-maximal consistent, it must be that ∀ xϕ
g\x ∈ w−. Let c ∈ Mw be a
witness such that ϕg\x[x←c] ∈ w−, which exists because w is fully witnessed. Let h be
the w-assignment that coincides with g everywhere except at x, where h(x) = c. Then
g ∼x h and ϕ
g\x[x←c] = ϕh. But this contradicts our earlier observation that for every
such h the formula ϕh is in w+.
For the right to left implication, let ∀ xϕg\x ∈ w+, and let h ∼x g be any w-
assignment. We want to show that M[p], w h ϕ. By the induction hypothesis this is
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the same as showing that ϕh ∈ w+. But ϕh = ϕg\x[x←h(x)], and this is in w+ by the
completeness and consistency of w.
Finally, consider the case of the diamond. For the left to right implication, assume
thatM[p], w g ♦ϕ. Then there is some world u such that wRu andM[p], u g
ι
ϕ. By
the induction hypothesis we obtain ϕg
ι
∈ u+, and consequently ϕg ∈ u+. Now, since
wRu, we also know that wRˆu by Lemma 5.11.(iii), and thus by Lemma 5.8 we obtain
♦ϕg ∈ w+ as desired.
For the right to left implication, assume that (♦ϕ)g ∈ w+. By the construction
of M[p], there is a world u such that ϕg ∈ u+ (and hence ϕg
ι
∈ u+) and wRu,
and then M[p], u g
ι
ϕ by the induction hypothesis, from which we finally conclude
M[p], w g ♦ϕ.
Theorem 5.14 (Completeness). If ϕ 6⊢ ψ, then there are an adequate model M, a
world w ∈ W , and a w-assignment g such that
M, w g ϕ and M, w 6g ψ.
Proof. Define a set of new constants C := {cxi | xi ∈ fv(p)} and let g be a map from the
set of variables to C that assigns cxi to xi for each i. Define p as 〈ϕ
g, ψg〉, and assume
it is not consistent, i.e., that ϕg ⊢ ψg. Then by (a generalization of) Rule 2.1.(xi) and
Lemma 2.6 we would get that ϕ ⊢ ψ. Thus p is consistent. Let M[p] be the model
generated from p as in Definition 5.10 and let w be the root of this model, which is
an extension of p. Lemma 5.13 tells us that M[p], w g ϕ and M[p], w 6g ψ because
ϕg ∈ w+ and ψg /∈ w+.
We conclude by noting that QRC1 has the finite model property, and is thus decid-
able.
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